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Abstract: 
Professor Jenicek's paper is confused, in that his proposal to “integrate” 
what he means by “evidence-based scientific theory and cognitive 
approaches to medical thinking” actually embodies a contradiction. But, 
although confused, he succeeds in teaching us more about the EBM debate 
than those who seem keen to forge ahead without addressing the 
underlying epistemological problems that Jenicek brings to our attention. 
Fundamental questions about the relationship between evidence, 
knowledge and reason still require resolution if we are to see a genuine 
advance in this debate. 
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Introductory remarks: on being smart enough to feel confused 
 
A philosophy student  developing an inquiry into the field of “bad arguments” would face two immediate 
and underlying puzzles: Firstly, why is the field so large, and  secondly, why are so many very well 
qualified academics amongst its contributors?
1
 Our intuition on reading Professor Jenicek's article in the 
recent EBM thematic edition of the Journal of Evaluation in Clinical Practice (hereafter referred to as 
“EBM-Cog”) was that there was something not only deeply confusing but also fundamentally confused 
about it. Of course there is a need for extreme caution when reacting in this way, especially to the work 
of a well qualified and well published contributor to a most serious debate. One needs to consider the 
possibility that the work expresses some insight that one has just failed to grasp, despite one's best 
efforts. So it is worth stressing that what follows is simply our best attempt to make sense of Jenicek's 
piece in the context of the broader debate to which he contributes, and to use it to identify and explore 
what we regard as a fundamental problem for that debate. Should it turn out that we have just missed 
the author's key point, we invite him to explain the point we have missed in language we can 
understand. 
Given that much of Jenicek’s prior work has had to do with how to construct scientific arguments, many 
readers may, like us, react to EBM-Cog by wondering:  “what is this about?” Quite often such a question 
expresses not anti-intellectualism or a failure to grasp a set of complex claims, but rather the exercise of 
critical faculties generating the sense “that a conclusion does not follow, that a line of argument 
someone has presented to us is either incomplete or just plain spurious”.
2
 Sometimes understanding the 
nature of the problem will require examining fundamental assumptions that we bring with us to the 
debate – for instance, assumptions about the nature of knowledge, evidence and reasoning and the 
relationships between them. In that case, whether we use the term or not, in our critical questioning we 
are doing philosophy.
1,2
 On this point,  we suspect that Jenicek would agree with us, though we find that 
a philosophical analysis of his own assumptions suggests that the confusing nature of his paper is not 
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simply the result of the difficulty of the subject matter, nor is it merely the product of the terminological 
overload that characterises his work. Rather, at the core of his thesis is a contradiction. He is committed 
to incompatible claims about medical knowledge and clinical reasoning. 
 
What makes EBM-Cog interesting is what it tells us about the broader debate and the fundamental 
problem the author is addressing. There is a method of argument in logic called reductio ad absurdum: if 
by asserting the truth of a particular thesis we find we are committed to a contradiction then, however 
plausible that thesis may seem, it must be false.  Jenicek is one author amongst many making serious 
efforts to resolve problems for Evidence-based Medicine (EBM). In answer to the question in our 
opening paragraph, arguments can sometimes be bad ones despite being well informed and well 
thought through.  This is because all arguments take place in the context of an intellectual history that is 
not complete.
3,4
 If our best efforts to defend a dominant intellectual starting point lead us to 
contradiction and confusion, or some other manner of practical and/or intellectual 'crisis'
5
 then it may be 
time not to expand or develop the existing 'paradigm'
6
 but to revise our thinking in a more fundamental 
way.  Jenicek deserves credit for identifying a deficit in EBM and attempting to supplement its 
conception of “scientific” medicine with alternative “cognitive approaches”.
5
 We will argue that the 
failure of these identified “approaches” to “interconnect” requires us to give more explicit attention to 
the underlying epistemological assumptions that frame the EBM debate. While we think he fails to solve 
the problem he identifies, that failure can, in itself, teach us something about its fundamental nature. 
There are times when proposing a confused solution to a problem is a better way to move a debate 
forward than simply insisting that there is nothing to feel confused about. 
 
Jenicek and EBM 
 
For over a decade, Milos Jenicek has offered himself as a 'voice of reason' in relationship to EBM. 
Specifically, he has published books and articles asserting the need to integrate principles of logic and 
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clinical reasoning into the fabric of EBM for the latter's goals and aspirations to be realized.
7-10
  EBM-Cog 
goes a step further, calling for the development of a new healthcare related cognitive science to bridge 
the gap between medical science and clinical practice. EBM-Cog proposes that such a science should 
pertain to the care of individual patients, to community medicine and to public health. Jenicek aims to 
draw the building blocks of his proposed new science from EBM, epidemiology, biostatistics, medical 
specialties, and health management, as well as from philosophy and the humanities. He refers to 
developments and progress in these and other spheres but does not elaborate what he means by them. 
In many cases his references are limited to self-citations. The references to “developments in the arts and 
humanities”, although particularly vague, suggest an awareness of the need to add a phenomenological 
dimension to the integration and emergent cognitive “discipline” that he seeks. 
 
To his credit, and in contrast to some recent literature,
11
  Jenicek stops short of attempting to expand the 
meaning of EBM per se to encompass the other disciplines at play in his vision.  Jenicek's call is 
nonetheless salient to contemporary issues surrounding EBM. EBM has for years espoused the 
integration of domains other than the results of clinical research into decision making, namely patient 
values and priorities, available resource issues, and clinical circumstances.
12,13
  However, it has never 
provided practical  guidance as to how such integration is to be achieved.
11
  Calls for the integration of 
the research literacy offered by EBM with humanism in healthcare and person-centered care have largely 
emanated from other sources.
14-17
  Jenicek's previous critical reviews suggest that EBM’s epidemiological 
approach to evidence and decision making  needs to be supplemented by attention to principles of logic 
and inference,
7
 and furthermore that EBM needs to acknowledge literature that is broadly critical of it 
and its precepts.
18
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The Nature of the Argument  
 
What, in fact, is Jenicek seeking?  His call is richly infused with what seems at times like an avalanche of 
arcane philosophical terms, including “iatrosophy”, which strains the ability of even standard dictionaries 
to decipher, but which apparently is intended to mean the study of thinking related to medical 
examination and treatment.  Our discussion therefore reflects interpretation, or translation, of the gist of 
the proposal embedded in EBM-Cog. 
In his text and using two figures, Jenicek unfolds a description of a process that may be simplified, 
abbreviated and summarized for purposes of comparison to the standard EBM formula (Table). Jenicek's 
description can be seen as interpolating two additional steps (numbers 1 and 5 of the Table ) into the 
standard EBM formula for clinical problem solving, a formula that can be summarized as “ask, acquire, 
appraise, apply”.
19
  The EBM prescription for problem solving conforms closely to the standard formula 
for “information literacy” that dates from 1980s visions of the information age.
20
  EBM, in the process of 
moving from clinician empowerment via passive skepticism to a more dynamic literacy movement,
11
 
adapted the information literacy model to the practice of medicine.
21
 Insofar as this formula is strictly 
adhered to, EBM regards the information needs encountered by clinicians in the course of evaluating and 
treating patients to be self-evident and inherently related to research designs.
22
 A related shortcoming of 
EBM has been observed to carry over into medical education, starting at the undergraduate level. 
Maggio et al
23
 reviewed published reports of EBM related educational interventions for medical 
undergraduates and found that only one in five included attention to the process of identifying 
information needs, i.e. step 1 in the Table.  The others took the process as self-evident for the purposes 
of their structured curricular approaches.  In the later stages of the problem solving cycle, the EBM 
literature considers the integration with other knowledge domains of information gleaned  from review 
of published research to be entrustable to a process with which EBM  need not be concerned. The EBM 
literature does not go beyond superficial acknowledgement of the relevance to that process of clinical 
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and social context as well as patient values and preferences.
12,24-29
  In other words, step 5 of Jenicek’s 
schema, as simplified in our Table, is omitted.  It is here that his quest seems most importantly to come 
to bear. 
 
Jenicek's solution to EBM's problem 
 
Familiarity with intellectual history helps to explain why EBM literature typically omits Jenicek's step 5. It 
has been argued that EBM's intellectual heritage is 'positivist' in nature,
24-29
 and, while this claim has 
been at least partially contested by EBM advocates, 
30
 EBM's consistent association with a conception of 
clinical reasoning which places research evidence at the top of a generic epistemic hierarchy (where 
famously mechanistic reasoning/'pathophysiologic rationale' and clinical judgment sit somewhere 
below) strongly suggests a link between the core ideas espoused by EBM authors and conceptions of 
causal reasoning developed by empiricist philosophy. The positivists' model of reasoning is typically 
characterised as 'deductivist' because it effectively equates rational argument – the presentation of good 
reasons to believe a conclusion - with logical validity. A deductively valid argument is one in which the 
conclusion follows logically from the premises presented, meaning that to deny the conclusion while 
asserting the truth of the premises is to be guilty of a formal contradiction. Deduction as a logical process 
cannot generate knowledge, because a deductively valid argument simply makes explicit a conclusion 
already 'contained' within the premises. And the great positivist thinkers
31-33
 are clear that it is the 
process of observation, the acquisition of empirical data, that generates the knowledge reported by true 
premises. Thus all knowledge (including any knowledge expressed in highly abstract, theoretical 
statements) is ultimately based on, or 'comes from', empirical evidence. As the great empiricist 
philosophers (most notably Locke
34
 and Hume
35
) argued, 'reason' is not the source of knowledge. The 
positivists (or 'logical empiricists') add to this a focus on meaning, asserting that theories are simply ways 
of organising data, and that their meaningfulness, even in the most complex scientific theories, is 
entirely a matter of their function in arranging large amounts of empirical information.  Ultimately, by 
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this view, the adequacy of any theory depends entirely on its ability to describe and predict the empirical 
data that will serve either to verify, confirm or falsify the theory. 
 
Hume famously argued that necessity is not a feature of experience and that experience simply reveals 
'constant conjunctions' of observed facts.
35
 This idea provides the basis of the claim that there can be no 
way of establishing causal connections other than identifying large-scale correlations of data. As Locke 
observed, systematic empirical science is the best way to gather and describe large amounts of data, 
such that all disciplines devoted to the study of reasoning (most notably philosophy) must regard 
themselves as 'under-labourers' to the empirical sciences.
34
 Thus positivism bolstered the view that only 
empirical data acquired in certain quite specific ways could provide 'objective evidence', giving rise to an 
intellectual culture in which judgment, personal experience and context-specific information were 
regarded with suspicion as 'subjective' factors, and even mechanistic reasoning was accorded a lower 
epistemic status than the gathering of information.
2,3,36,37
 
 
Positivist assumptions are so deeply embedded within our contemporary 'common-sense' that they may 
strike some 'practically minded' authors as too obvious to require defense or even explicit articulation. 
2,37
  In fact, far from being sheer common sense or 'just plain obvious', this philosophical position has 
been subjected to extensive criticism, and the problems it creates for scientific practice have been well 
documented.
4,38,39
  Rationalist thinkers have argued that an adequate account of many forms of scientific 
reasoning requires positing innate human capacities "not based on experience" to "generate hypotheses 
about what in general the world might possibly be like" and then to "reject those we see could not 
include ourselves and our experiences".
4
 The debate has by no means been “settled” one way or the 
other, but few would now defend the strict empiricism of the logical positivists, precisely because it 
seems too restrictive to explain how many ordinary cases of reasoning are legitimate.
3,37
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That said, the influence of positivist ideas on the development of EBM seems clear – its privileging of 
research evidence over expert opinion, limited, personal, context-specific experience, intuition and 
mechanistic reasoning would seem to follow (strictly, deductively) from the conceptions of knowledge 
and reasoning developed in the empiricist tradition. The one clearly epistemological thesis associated 
with the various statements of EBM over the decades has been the idea of a “hierarchy of evidence”. 
 
Tonelli
40
 argues that, in EBM, the results of empirical research function as 'the major premises' from 
which conclusions about particular cases are deduced. The problem, of course, (as numerous authors 
have noted over a number of years
1
) is that the process is invalid as no conclusion about any specific case 
follows deductively from general premises. Hence, despite all of the references in EBM literature to the 
need to 'integrate' other warrants for practical conclusions to bridge the logical gap, the process goes 
largely unexplained.
40
 
This seems to be Jenicek's point of entrance to the debate. He hopes to supplement EBM with 'gnostic 
processes' which, it seems, we should construe as forms of reasoning that go beyond the strict empiricist 
model of deductive validity. He characterises these 'gnostic or epistemological processes' as 'those 
processes that generate knowledge' and his whole point seems to be that you need much more than the 
Humean/positivist model of "observation plus deduction" to arrive at any substantive conclusions.  If the 
'gnostic process' is anything other than strict logical deduction (from premises derived from observation) 
and it does really 'generate knowledge', then that seems to imply some form of rationalism in 
epistemology. In short, he supplies a rationalist solution to the problem created by EBM's empiricism. 
Step 5 of his proposed “new medical cognitive science” simply inserts a conception of reasoning that is 
logically incompatible with empiricism into a process whose basis and legitimacy derives from 
empiricism. This perhaps explains why standard EBM literature has tended to omit this step. 
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Quite apart from the difficulties in understanding the specific nature of this supposed solution, (for 
example, how precisely the forms of reasoning Jenicek proposes work, especially against the background 
of his own, deeply confused, approach to philosophical logic
41,42
),  we have a problem with the idea of 
'supplementing' one approach with another when the two seem logically incompatible. EBM-Cog is 
confusing not just because it adopts a general stylistic approach of 'why choose one familiar word when 
five unfamiliar ones will do just as well?' It is confusing because at its own 'base' there seems to be a 
fundamental confusion. If EBM's whole basis for privileging certain sorts of evidence over others is 
philosophically unfounded (i.e., if empiricism is the wrong philosophy, which it must be if Jenicek's 
implicit rationalism is tenable) then the correct thing to do is not to supplement this philosophy with 
something else but to reject it altogether. 
 
Jenicek's characterisation of clinical reasoning might be defended by claiming either that medicine is not 
a science, or that science is not the strict, empirical-deductive process described by the positivists. At 
points he seems to be saying both of these things. But either way, he no longer has a position that seems 
compatible with EBM. What we need is not a 'paradigm extension' but rather a new (or different) 
paradigm. Or even better, (dropping the unnecessary and inappropriate use of Kuhn's jargon, an 
intellectual pretension for which Jenicek cannot be held responsible as it has been part of the debate 
since 1992
6
), what we need is a different way of thinking about rationality and decision-making in clinical 
practice.  
 
Conclusion: implications for “the EBM debate” 
 
For this commentary we have chosen to avoid dwelling on the many points of unclarity that make EBM-
Cog a confusing read and to focus on an issue that may not immediately strike some readers as crucial, 
but whose significance cannot be over-stated in any serious analysis of the current EBM debate. That is, 
the question of epistemic commitment: a phrase we use here to indicate the underlying presuppositions 
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about the nature of knowledge to which contributors to a discussion commit themselves by the claims 
they make. At a time when influential authors are calling for the 'science' of EBM to be 'expanded' and 
for its underlying knowledge base to be 'supplemented'
11
 it is crucial that we are clear on which 
assumptions about knowledge we are committed to if we accept certain claims. We therefore begin our 
conclusion by recapitulating our interpretation of EBM-Cog 
 
EBM has consistently been proposed not as a trivial or platitudinous claim, but as a substantive thesis 
concerning medical knowledge.
1
 While the term can of course be used in many different ways, key 
defenders of EBM have, from the outset, asserted  the idea of a generic epistemic hierarchy of evidence, 
with evidence from clinical research at the top and with the randomized trial constituting the only “real 
evidence” one can admit to support causal conclusions regarding effectiveness.
43
 Other clinical research 
designs may be admitted, but only on the understanding that they are imperfect surrogates for 
randomized trial data. We have argued that if such a thesis is indeed entailed by what its defenders have 
called the EBM 'paradigm'
6
 then it is thoroughly grounded in, and, logically committed to, empiricist 
epistemology. 
In EBM-Cog, Jenicek proposes a “new medical cognitive science”. The specific quest appears to be for a 
construct or model to enhance our understanding of what the EBM literature terms the movement from 
evidence to action (Table).
44
 Whereas EBM has at times verged on a denial of the difference between 
evidence, defined as information from clinical research, and knowledge (as a consequence of its own 
epistemic commitment), Jenicek recognizes the need for a cognitive process going beyond the evidence 
per se for the latter to have meaningful impact on practice. While he refrains from explicit alignment 
with a philosophical school or tendency, we have argued that such a view commits him to some version 
of rationalism in epistemology. Indeed, EBM-Cog’s concluding statement is: “Rational uses of medical 
evidence are as important as evidence itself”. While there is nothing evidently absurd in such a 
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commitment, it is clearly logically incompatible with a commitment to empiricism. It is hard to overstate 
the seriousness of the error in attempting to defend a position by 'supplementing' it with claims that are 
logically incompatible with its own underlying assumptions. 
 
EBM-Cog, perhaps because of the confused natured of its argument, has provided us with a useful 
vehicle with which to explore the philosophical underpinnings of the longstanding EBM debate.  Perhaps 
the most useful principle illustrated by our exploration is that, in the quest to remedy the ills and 
limitations of the EBM paradigm, a viable philosophical and epistemological framework is the essential 
starting point.  Adding one non-viable framework, in this case Jenicek’s version of rationalism, to another 
such framework (empiricism) can never adequately fix the latter.  
 
However, precedents pointing beyond the rationalist-empiricist dilemma exist within healthcare and we 
will identify a few potentially guiding examples.  We resist prematurely plunging into a full scale attempt 
to define a path or formula for achievement of the mission proposed by Jenicek, or to identify a 
comprehensive list of ingredients. Indeed, a list of generic disciplines such as suggested in EBM-Cog, 
many of which are themselves populated by conflicting epistemologies and traditions, is premature. Only 
after defining a philosophically viable overall framework will it possible to harvest the fruits of empiricist 
methodologies in a fashion that maximizes their value.   
 
Jenicek himself has at least flirted with bodies of work that suggest pathways beyond the 
rationalist/empiricist conundrum. One is the accumulating literature on ‘dual process’ theory, a construct 
that acknowledges that both intuitive and analytic modalities of cognition operate in the context of 
clinical practice, particularly diagnostic reasoning.  EBM-Cog cites one source article on dual process 
theory without mention of its content.
9
  The construct does not itself define an epistemology and is 
subject to reductionist interpretations.
45
 However, by acknowledging tacit processes at play in medical 
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cognition, it is also consistent with more explicitly non-reductionist concepts. An example is the notion of 
reflective practice introduced by Donald Schon.
46
 Schon rejected the notion of professional expertise as 
the perfection of the ability to apply fixed rules and principles to practical problem solving and 
emphasized the improvisational dimension (reflection in action) in tandem with analytical reflection 
(reflection on action). Schon’s model of expertise informed the development of the relationship centered 
care construct.
16,17
 The latter is an excellent example of an approach framed with explicit reference to 
philosophical frameworks leading beyond the rationalist-empiricist dichotomy, particularly the 
phenomenology of Merleau-Ponty 
47
 and the writings of  Polanyi.
48
  Another source cited but not 
explored by EBM-Cog  is Montgomery’s “How Doctors Think.”
49
 Montgomery’s  casuistic approach to 
clinical problem solving is based on a reduction of empiricist science as the foundational basis of clinical 
practice, but not as a crucial dimension of healthcare.  These examples, while not providing the finished 
blueprint of medical cognition and reflection apparently sought by EBM-Cog, may nonetheless, at least 
preliminarily, point the way to such a thing by demonstrating that it one can be empirical without being 
an ‘empiricist’ and that it is possible to know without succumbing to rigid hierarchies of knowledge or of 
research designs such as those promulgated by EBM.  
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Evidence, empiricism and reason 
 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
EBM-Cog  (Jenicek 2015) EBM (Dawes et al19) 
1.   Delineating a healthcare problem 1. ----- 
2. Identifying key questions and information needs  
 
2. Ask a question 
3. Collecting and summarizing relevant evidence, 
observations and measurements 
 
3. Acquire the evidence 
4. Evaluating relevant evidence, observations, and 
measurements using the tools of epidemiology, 
biostatistics and qualitative research 
 
4. Appraise the evidence 
5. Reasoning about the results of the above steps 
 
5.----- 
6. Formulating recommendations, such as those 
found in clinical practice guidelines; decision-making  
 
6. Apply the evidence to decision 
making (“evidence to action”) 
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